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The Choice of the Working Sector in Italy: 
a Trivariate Probit Analysis
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A b stract
Using the Budget of Italian Families Survey by Banca d ’lta lia  
we analyse the sectoral choice of the Italian workers among the 
private, public and self-employed options. The choice is modelled 
using a trivariate probit which allows one to release the IIA  hy­
pothesis, imposed by the multinomial logit model. The validity 
of the IIA assumption is strongly rejected and a negative corre­
lation between the utilities of working in the private and public 
sectors is found. Moreover, the significance of many individual 
specific variables in the estim ated model supports the intuition of 
the existence some diversity among workers choosing the different 
sectors.
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sectoral choice, Italian labour market.
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The aim of the present study is to analyse the allocation of workers across 
the private, the public and the self-employed sectors. The distinction bet­
ween these three sectors, we believe, reflects diversities in the preferences 
of individuals (and thus in “types” of individuals) entering them, even 
in the presence of rationing situations.
The empirical studies carried out up to now on the working “sec­
tors” , however, have mainly focused on the distinction among productive 
sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services, etc.) and have only seldom 
adopted as a definition of “sector” the legal nature of the employer organi­
zing the productive activity (be this public, private or self-employment). 
When this has happened, it has generally been in situations requiring 
the correction of a main equation from selection bias, like, for example, 
when estimating the wage differentials between the private and the pu­
blic sectors1 (in this case the analysis of the choice between the private 
and the public sector is needed precisely for the estimation of the selecti­
vity bias in order to correct the wage equations) or in studies limited to 
only one sector, like, for example, in the analysis about self-employment.2 
This is why a systematic analysis of the “choice” of the sector as defined 
above is of great interest.
Another novel feature of the present study lies in the econometric 
approach chosen. We propose the adoption of a multinomial probit mo­
del, which has the advantage of taking into account the possible presence 
of correlation among the utilities deriving from each alternative. The 
estimation of a multinomial probit is not common in the literature, gi­
ven the computational burden it requires. What is commonly estimated 
instead is a multinomial logit (imposing the absence of correlation bet­
ween the utilities), whose estimation is much simpler and an option in all 
the microeconometric packages.3 In particular, the probit specification
'See, for example, Pedersen et al. (1990), Brunello - Rizzi (1993), Hartog - Oo- 
sterbeek (1993), Dustmann - van Soest (1995), Bardasi (1996).
2See, for example, Rees - Shah (1986), Smeaton (1992).



























































































is found to be more appropriate than the logit one for the data we ana­
lyse, i.e. the Banca d ’ltalia Sample Survey on Budget of Italian Families 
(1993). In fact, the estimated correlation coefficients are significantly 
different from zero for both models we estimate for women and men re­
spectively. The estimated correlation coefficients also have an economic 
interpretation in terms of correlation between utilities, that is “distance” 
between options. The strongly negative correlation coefficient we obtain 
- both for men and for women - implies a negative covariance between 
the utility of working in the private sector and the utility of working as 
a private employee, thus indicating the existence of profound differences 
between these types of workers.
Moreover, the results of logit and probit estimation exhibit substan­
tial differences in terms of predicted probabilities and marginal effects of 
the explanatory variables, supporting the conclusion that it is important 
to adopt the more general probit formulation for multivariate choice mo­
dels, while the zero covariance structure imposed by the logit formulation 
may be the source of misleading results.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theo­
retical underpinning for introducing the self-employedchoice as a third 
alternative and introduces the framework for empirical models on the 
sectoral choice in labour economics. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis 
of the identification and estimation problems characterizing multivariate 
probit models. Section 4 contains a description of the data and the model 
adopted, the results relative to the different steps needed for its estima­
tion and, finally, an extended analysis and interpretation of the results 
obtained.
for the estimation of only one covariance of the variance-covariance matrix, while the 
others are kept constrained to zero. The multinomial probit is therefore more general 




























































































2 Analysis of the sectoral choice
2.1 T h eoretica l asp ects
Both neoclassical and non-competitive theories provide explanations of 
the allocation of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. On the 
one hand, workers possess various skills and preferences, on the other 
hand, employers offer jobs that differ in skill content, security and wor­
king environment. The basic assumption made in a neoclassical frame­
work is that workers try to maximize utility and not simply their mone­
tary income; this means that they are interested in both the pecuniary 
and the non-pecuniary aspects of the job they perform. Now, jobs are 
different because some require more education and training, some are 
clean and others are dirty or dangerous, some require personal initiative 
and responsability and other are monotonous, some are secure from layoff 
and others are risky and strictly dependent on market conditions. All 
these job characteristics influence workers’ utility and, as a consequence, 
individual choice.
One well-known job-matching explanation in a neoclassical frame­
work is the “hedonic model” by Sherwin Rosen (1974), which accounts for 
the co-existence', in equilibrium, of different pairs of “type of worker-kind 
of job” at different wage levels. If the first implication of the model - that 
wages for more unpleasant jobs are higher - has been extensively criticized 
from a theoretical and an empirical perspective, the second implication 
- that workers with strong preferences for certain job characteristics will 
choose, in the absence of other constraints, the jobs with these characte­
ristics, offered by the employers who most cheaply can generate them - 
is more uncontroversial.
In rejecting the functioning of a market clearing mechanism, dual la­
bour market and segmentation theories emphasize the existence of queues 
in the “primary sector” , but also in this case the theory is in perfect 
agreement with the observation of different workers allocated in different 
sectors.4




























































































The question we address here is if “sectors” - as these are defi­
ned according to the legal nature of the employer - can be treated as 
heterogeneous “jobs” with regard to the working conditions, place secu­
rity, education and training required and the organisation of the acti­
vity so as to attract individuals with different tastes and characteristics. 
The purpose is not to test the validity of one theory vs. the other, but 
to make an empirical investigation of the features and the motivations 
which unite groups of individuals working for the same “type” of em­
ployer. The definition of “sector” adopted has allowed us to distinguish 
between three main status: private workers (individuals employed by a 
private employer), public workers (individuals employed by a public ad­
ministration) and the self-employed (individuals working on their own 
account). The idea is that the classification in private, public and the 
self-employed sectors (i.e. on the basis of the nature of the employer) is 
at least as valid as the classification in productive sectors (i.e. on the 
basis of the nature of the product and/or the production process), be- 
couse there exists a series of aspects that characterize them as different 
sectors..
In fact, the public sector characterizes, in Italy - at least up to 
now, the degree of job security (which is virtually complete), the level of 
education generally required (very high, particularly in some sub-sectors 
like those of health and the education)5, the structure of the working 
hours in most subsectors (which offer a large amount of leisure and the 
opportunity of a collateral activity) and the social reputation of many 
occupations. On the other hand, the private sector leaves more scope for 
individual initiative and personal responsability and, thanks to greater 
mobility and flexibility, offers more possibilities for a career. Finally, self- 
employment can be singled out for the highest degree of independence 
that it offers in organizing working activity, and for the high level of 
autonomy in decision-making, even if this incurs a higher level of risk 
and income variability. It is therefore reasonable to assume that these
markets, see Lang-Dickens (1988).
5 In the public sector the presence of blue-collar workers with a low level of educa­




























































































different job characteristics and working environments attract individuals 
with different tastes and preferences, which are likely to be correlated 
with personal characteristics.
2.2 E m pirical m od elling
The usual way by which the choice of the sector is modelled is, in a 
neoclassical framework, by means of the individual utility function:
Uij =  U(Wi j ,Cj ) (1)
where Uij is the utility of individual i in sector j ,  W,j is the correspon­
ding wage and Cj are the characteristics of the working environment of 
sector j .  Empirically, the model to be estimated is formulated as a latent 
variable model:
/*, =  y’Z,, + etJ (2)
7* is a latent variable which may be interpreted as an indicator of the 
expected utility for individual i arising from choosing the j-th  sector, 
'y'jZij being the deterministic component6 and eVJ the random compo­
nent of utility. Zij is a vector of individual specific explanatory variables 
influencing the sectoral choice and 7 ' is the corresponding vector of para­
meters to be estimated. Z^ includes therefore all the variables expected 
to determine the earning opportunities and those related to the tastes and 
the individual preferences for the job characteristics. It is not possible 
to observe /,’ , but only its realization:
1 = 3 i f f  ri] > max/,* Vfc f  j
i.e. the individual will choose sector j  if the total utility associated with 
this choice is greater than the utility he/she would obtain in every other 
possible sector. In the above formulation the choice is depicted as a pure
6The Z's  variables are treated are non-stochastic, as it is usual to work conditio­



























































































choice, i.e. possible rationing situations are ignored. Alternatively, a 
reduced form interpretation is possible, where supply and demand side 
effects mix and cannot be disentangled. In the latter case, what we ob­
serve, Iij , is jointly generated by the behaviour of the worker, who tries 
to maximize his personal utility, and the imperfect functioning of the la­
bour market, where queues at the entrance of certain sectors arise. The 
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables therefore capture the 
joint effect of genuine preferences of the worker and employer’s prefe­
rences as regards workers’ characteristics.
The above reported model can easily be estimated using a multi­
nomial logit model, which has the advantage of greater simplicity, but 
imposes very strong restrictions on the errors structure. In fact, the 
multinomial logit model is based on the assumption that errors Ej are in­
dependently distributed with type I extreme-value distribution function,7 
which implies the validity of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) property. This means that the utilities deriving from the three 
choices are mutually uncorrelated for the same individual, that is, the 
fact of getting a higher utility from choice j  does not “tell” anything 
about the level of utility arising from any other alternative. This is unli­
kely to be true if certain characteristics of the sectors make two of them 
“closer”, that is, more similar, than the third one. This is the reason why 
we have decided to estimate equation (2) using a multinomial probit mo­
del, which assumes that the error terms Ej are distributed as a trivariate 
normal with covariance matrix £, in which any term outside the main 
diagonal can be different from zero (that is, correlation between utilities 
is allowed).
3 Identification and estim ation in the mul­
tinom ial probit model
There are several concerning the econometrics of the multinomial probit, 
model which are non trivial and therefore make it worth reviewing before




























































































applying it to real data. In this section, we start with a discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical identification aspects as emerge in the existing 
literature, focussing on the trivariate case. A brief review of the possible 
estimation methods is then presented, extending the reference to the 
general case involving more than three choices. Finally, we deal with 
the implementation of the estimation procedure in the trivariate case of 
interest, whose correct functioning is evaluated through a Monte Carlo 
experiment.
3.1 T h e id entification  problem
The trivariate probit model assumes that individuals select one of three 
mutually exclusive alternatives. The random utilities of individual i, i = 
for choices 1,2,3 are formulated as:
U;i =  Ofi +  +  £ji
Uj2 = 0-2 +  X;/?2 +  Ei2 (3)
U,Z =  <*3 +  if, 1% + Si3
where: x,- is a (k x 1 ) vector of explanatory variables for individual i, 
which may contain both individual specific characteristics and alternative 
specific attributes faced by individual i; £,• =  (sn ,£12, Eis)' is a vector 
of stochastic terms which is assumed to be distributed as a trivariate 
normal, identically and independently across the N  individuals, with 
zero mean and covariance matrix E:
1 ^11 (T\2 Cf 13 ^
021 022 023
v 031 032 033 )
Arranging the parameters in (3) as a = (ay, a 2, a^)', 0 =  (0[, 0'2,0'3)', 
the log-likelihood function associated with the model is:
L (a ,/?, E) =  i  £  £  m* In iV a ,/? ,£ )  W
i=ij=i




























































































where =  1 if individual i chooses alternative j  and mtJ =  0 other­
wise, while Pjj — Pr(uy > a,*., k /  j  — 1,2,3) represents the probability 
that individual i chooses alternative j  and involves the evaluation of a 
bivariate integral in this three alternative case. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to get unique maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters 
a,/?, E in the above model, as it is not identified. Dansie (1985) gives the 
first systematic explanation of the identification problem in multinomial 
probit models and of its two sources. The first source of the identification 
problem is that the observed choices are only informative on the diffe­
rences of the utilities and not on the utilities themselves. This means 
that in (4) all the probabilities of selection can be rewritten in terms 
of differenced utilities without altering the value of the log-likelihood 
function, for example:
< i =  «>;i -  Wi3 =  +  ï'Æî +  £*i
< 2 =  « .2  -  « i s  =  a*2 +  £ i/? 2  +  £h  ( 5 )
Ui 3 =  0
where f t  = ai -  a3, f t  — /?/ -  f t ,  £*, = eu -  ei3 , l =  1,2. As a con­
sequence, the relevant distribution of the disturbances is not the above- 
mentioned trivariate one, but the bivariate distribution of £i = (e n ,£ n ) ',  
which is normal with zero mean and covariance matrix E*:
E* =  Cov(e*) =
with a*k =  E(cu — c,3 )(e,k — £,-3 ), l,k  =  1,2. The second aspect of 
the identifiability of the model concerns the lack of information on the 
scale in the available data, i.e. u*tl and u*i2 can be multiplied by an arbi­
trary constant without changing the value of the log-likelihood function. 
Therefore, in order to achieve identification, it is necessary to impose a 
restriction on E*, and only two out of the three parameters of the biva­
riate covariance matrix are identified. The usual way of imposing this 
identification restriction is to standardize in order to have the first utility 





























































































«?f = = < + s!,PV + £«
u *2 — — a 2* +  2 *  +  £ *i2
U*3 — 0
with a,** =  /*. ■, /?/** =  ft. , £** — ;  ; Tg*, i — 1,2, and:
y^u V17” v <rii
1£** = Cov(e**) = 712T** (T**7 21 "22
with o\£ = --h r , l ,k  = 1 , 2.
V<Tn
With the above no 
fied model is written as:
'* ~  7 % '
tation, the log-likelihood function of the identi-
L (a “ , /?**,£**) =  -  l 3m y ln P J * ( a " ,/T .E " )  (7)
where, P*’ =  Pr(u”  > u*£, /c /  j  =  1,2,3). We have, for example:
P*r(«” ,/?**,S**) =  P r(< 1* > u S , u J 1* > 0 )
(« r+ ^ri-o r+ aW ) (8)
=  f - o o J-oo < P ( 2 l , 2 2 ; P l )  < * * 1 ^ 2
where <p(2i , 22; Pi) is the bivariate normal density function of two random 
variables having zero mean, unit variance and correlation coefficient p\ —
1  1 ---- . Similarly P,”  and P*,* can be derived.v/l+<rJJ-2<r”
The approach described above, consisting of working directly in a 
J  — 1 space (where, more generally, J  is the total number of the al­
ternatives), is recommended by Bunch (1991), who warns against the 
practice, quite often adopted in multinomial probit applications, of try­
ing to achieve identification by imposing arbitrary normalizations and 
identification restrictions in the J  space, for example, by setting some of 
the covariances equal to zero. Indeed, this can lead to invalid (i.e. non 




























































































However, formulating the model according to the identification cri­
teria outlined above does not completely solve the issue of its estimability. 
Keane (1992) notices that a formally identified multinomial probit mo­
del, i.e. a model specified as (7), can still be difficult to estimate as there 
exist a range of values of the parameters for which the log-likeliliood 
function assumes different values all very close to its maximum. This 
case is referred to by Keane as tenuous identification and is likely to be a 
serious problem in multinomial probit applications whenever the model 
does not include some exclusion restrictions. As a matter of facts, the 
Keane’s study should be considered as a ridefinition in the literature of 
the identification conditions for estimation of multinomial probit para­
meters. The lack of identificability arises from the fact that the effect of 
changes in the regression coefficients can be mimicked by changes in the 
parameters of the covariance matrix. This problem disappears if exclu­
sion restrictions are introduced, i.e. if there are some alternative-specific 
attributes which enter as regressors only the utility function associated 
with one alternative and not the others. Keane shows through some si­
mulation experiments that in the absence of exclusion restrictions, if the 
model is estimated by imposing some false constraint on the parameters, 
the corresponding maximized likelihood function does not suffer from 
a significant deterioration. Moreover, the parameter estimates exhibit 
big standard errors. These features disappear, however, in the presence 
of exclusion restrictions, as false constraints are rejected by appropriate 
likelihood tests and the parameters are estimated with satisfactory pre­
cision.
The above considerations on both the issue of formal identification 
and the necessity of putting forward a specification with exclusion restric­
tions have been kept in mind for the estimation of the trinomial probit 
model for the choice of the sector of occupation we present in section 4.
3.2 E stim ation  m eth od s
As previously stated, the interest in the formulation of a probit specifica­




























































































the covariances among the error terms of the utility functions.8 From the 
econometric point of view, however, the estimation of the probit model 
poses some difficulties due to the presence of multiple integrals in the 
likelihood function; more particularly, it contains integrals of the multi­
variate normal distribution whose dimension is equal to the number of 
alternatives minus one (see (8)). Because of this computational difficulty, 
most applied studies are based on the multinomial logit, despite the fact 
that the multinomial probit should be preferred for its greater generality 
in the specification of the covariance structure.
When the dimension of the integrals is no greater than four, cor­
responding to five alternatives in the model, numerical methods relying 
on different algorithms can be used to solve the multivariate normal in­
tegration problem which arises in the process of maximization of the 
likelihood function (see Pudney, 1988, Appendix 3 and Tong, 1990 for 
some surveys of these methods). This is the case in the three alterna­
tive probit models we consider in this paper, whose likelihood function 
involves bivariate normal integrals that can be evaluated numerically.
In order to cope with the general case in which the model under 
scrutiny postulates a series of alternatives higher than five, a number 
of methods based on simulation have been put forward in the litera­
ture. The existing simulation-based proposals for multinomial probit 
estimation can be grouped as follows: thoses which are based on clas­
sical estimation methods but use probability simulators, the Bayesian 
approach, and the Indirect Inference methodology. Geweke et al. (1994) 
compare the performance of some methods belonging to the first two 
groups through some Monte Carlo experiments, including the Simulated 
Method of Moments (McFadden, 1989 and Pakes and Pollard, 1989) and 
the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (Lerman and Manski, 1981) using 
the GHK (Geweke et al., 1991) and Kernel Smoothing (Me Fadden, 1989)
8Notice that the estimation of the additional parameters of the covariance matrix 
is theoretically possible to achieve without any constraint on the regressions of the 
utility functions. Moreover, the introduction of exclusion restrictions takes the form 
of the introduction of sector-specific variables which might be found to be important 




























































































probability simulators, and Bayesian Inference using Gibbs sampling (Me 
Culloch and Rossi, 1994). Their main finding is that bayesian inference 
outperforms these two classical methods, while it is difficult to choose 
one out of the two classical procedures considered once the GHK pro­
bability simulator is adopted. As far as Indirect Inference is concerned, 
Gourieroux et al. (1993) suggest the use of a logit approximation as an 
auxiliary model for the estimation of the parameters of a multinomial 
probit formulation. The study of the performance of latter approach and 
its application to multivariate probit models is an interesting field for 
future research .
3.3 A ssessin g  th e  estim a tio n  tech n iq u e in th e  triva­
riate case
In order to achieve the estimation of the parameters of the trivariate 
probit model of section 4.3.2, a code has been built up in Gauss 3.2 
which exploits:
a) the existing Gauss routine for the numerical computation of the bi­
variate normal integrals appearing in the log-likelihood function;
b) the maximization module “maxlik” for the numerical maximization
of the trivariate probit likelihood function through the BHHH al­
gorithm, which avoids the computation of second order derivatives 
and approximates the Hessian matrix by the negative of the outer 
product of the gradient.9
Given the complexity of the estimation problem, the correct func­
tioning of the algorithm has in a first step been verified on simulated 
data, which was chosen in order for them to be generated as in Keane
9 The gradient has been evaluated numerically. A subsequent check after the cal­
culation of the analytical first order derivatives of the loglikelihood revealed that the 
accuracy of the numerical derivatives is very high. In fact, they coincide with the 




























































































(1992). This way, we obtain both a benchmark of the estimation proce­
dure and the possibility of confirming the existence of the lack of iden­
tification already evidenced by Keane’s results. Two different samples 
of 8,000 observations (Sample 1 , Sample 2) have been generated accor­
ding to the following identified model, with the exclusion restrictions
= 0, d22 = 0:
U*1 =  Qu* +  P nXli +  P*2x2i +  P u x3i +  £i* .
< 2* =  a;* +  +  @22x 2i + P*2>M +  £*2 ’
where:
(  ^J ~ N .I.I .D .(Q,E"),
xy  ~  N .I.I.D .(6 ,5), x 2t and x3t are dummies which assume the value 1 
with probability 0.5.
Table 1 contains the results of the estimation procedure for both 
samples and the mean across the two in both the unrestricted case (i.e. 
when all the parameters are estimated) and when the model is estimated 
by imposing the exclusion restrictions /3 = 0, /322 =  0.10 The crucial role 
of imposing some exclusion restrictions in order to get precise estimate of 
the parameters, as well as the reliability of the implemented estimation 
procedure, is apparent from the table. For example, it can be seen that 
in both the unrestricted cases the null hypothesis crj2 =  0 would be 
accepted, although the data have been generated from a process in which 
<7j2 =  0.9. On the contrary, such a null hypothesis would be rejected in 
both the restricted cases.
10As starting values for the numerical maximization the true values have been used 
for simplicity. The numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the estimates 




























































































Table 1. S im ulation results.
U nrestric ted  and restric ted  estim ations of the  triva ria te  probit. 
Two sam ples of 8,000 obs.
True val. Sam ple 1 Sam ple 2 M ean
Unres. Res. Unres. Res. Unres. Res.
-0.80
-0.816 -0.792 -0.782 -0.739 -0.799 -0.766
a l (0.063) (0.053) (0.063) (0.053) (0.063) (0.053)















0.154 - 0.078 - 0.116 -















0.372 0.438 0.716 0.397 0.544 0.418
(0.125) (0.047) (0.491) (0.045) (0.269) (0.046)
Ptt 0
0.053 - 0.546 - 0.300 -








































4 A m odel of sectoral choice in Italy
4.1 T h e data
The data we use comes from the Banca d’ltalia Sample Survey on the 
Budgets of Italian Families. This is a relatively unexploited data set, 
which contains information about the economic behaviour of Italian fa­
milies at the microeconomic level. The basic survey unit is each member 
of a sampled family. In 1993 - the year of the last available data, which 
we are going to use - 8,089 families, corresponding to 24,013 individuals 




























































































our analysis are the 7,688 individuals who were working on 31.12.1993. 
Personal data on each individual are recorded. These include sex, age, 
education (highest level of education attained), family relationship, mar­
ital status and the geographical area where the family lives. Data on 
participation in the labour market include the sector of activity (the pro­
duction sector), the status (employee or self-employed worker) and the 
qualification (blue collar - white collar - manager). Besides education, 
Recorded human capital variables are total work experience11 and senio­
rity with the same employer, this latter variable representing a proxy for 
the specific human capital. The possibility of having access to a detailed 
personal section in addition to the data on wages and hours worked gives 
the Banca dTtalia Survey a great advantage over other sources such as 
ISTAT (Central Statistical Office) or INPS (National Institute for Social 
Security), which are perhaps more accurate in reporting the wages and 
hours worked, but which lack information on individual characteristics.
Each worker has been assigned to one of the sectors, private, public 
and self-employment, according to his main activity at end of 1993. Given 
that the Banca d’ltalia questionnaire only records the main activity of 
the year as a whole (which is viewed as the prevailing activity since it 
has absorbed the greater number of the months in the year, the hours 
in the week, and so on), the precise activity of the worker on 31.12.1993 
has been established by crossing several pieces of information reported 
in the sections recording each single source of income, in the section 
devoted to workers’ mobility and in the introductory part, referring to 
the worker’s personal characteristics. If for some individuals a degree of 
uncertainty about inclusion in one of the previously indicated categories 
might exist, in general the procedure adopted has proved quite reliable 
on the basis of all the controls carried out afterwards. In any case, the 
analysis of occupational status requires the researcher to fix one point in 
time and the most obvious choice for this seemed to be the end of the
"T h e  total work experience is not directly recorded in the questionnaire but is 
approximated by subtracting the age at which the individual started working from 
his/her age at 31.12.1993. This is obviously a crude and imperfect measure of this 
variable (presenting moreover an asimmetry between men and women, given that 
women are more likely to interrupt their working career), but it is the best a researcher 




























































































year. In Table 2 the distribution across the sectors of individuals, male 
and female, working at end of 1993 is presented.
T able 2. D istr ib u tio n  o f  th e  w orkers across th e  p rivate, public and
self.-em p l. sectors.
P r iv a te  sector P u b lic  sector S elf-em pl. T otal
N o. % N o. % N o. %
M en 2320 46.74 1338 26.96 1306 26.31 4964
W om en 1104 40.53 1070 39.28 550 20.19 2724
T otal 3424 44.54 2408 31.32 1856 24.14 7688
Both “private” and “public” workers constitute the category of “employ­
ees”, contrasting with the category of the “self-employed”, singled out 
by the Banca d ’ltalia questionnaire. In the terminology of Banca d ’lta- 
lia, “self-employed” is the broadest definition to indicate every kind of 
worker earning money from their own business, while “employee” indi­
cates the worker who is paid by an employer. The public workers are 
the individuals working in one of the two productive sectors indicated in 
the questionnaire as clearly constituting the public area, those of “public 
administration” and “education and health”, while the private workers 
constitute the remaining group.
4.2  T h e  m od el and th e  choice o f  th e  exp lan atory  
variables.
In the model we are proposing, the individual can choose among three 
alternatives: 1) public employment, 2) private employment and 3) self- 
employment. As previously indicated, the choice of the sector is expected 
to be affected by relative earnings opportunities, by individual tastes for 
job characteristics and by personal attributes, which account for prefe­
rences and attitudes towards risk. One of the most obvious differences 
among the occupations in the three sectors is the degree of job stability 
and, therefore, the variance of expected earnings, self-employment no 
doubt being the most risky choice and public employment the least. Per­




























































































for safety” , and therefore for the attitute toward risk, as well as for indi­
vidual preferences towards specific characteristics of the occupations. In 
the data set no choice specific variable appears, but it can be reasonably 
assumed that individual characteristics are correlated with tastes for job 
characteristics.
As proxies for “exposure to risk” the value of the total wealth ow­
ned by the family has been chosen. This variable - entering the model 
both linearly and squared - is supposed to capture the “degree of pro­
tection” enjoyed by the individual and therefore his willingness to take 
or to avoid the risks associated with certain occupations, in particular, 
with the self-employedsector. Other variables playing a similar role are 
the presence of other sources of income in the family, which means a 
diversification of risk, and of earnings other than income from the main 
activity earned by the worker himself, the number of income recipients, 
the marital status and role of the head of the family, these latter captu­
ring the degree of family responsibilities. Personal characteristics such 
as age and level of education are obviously correlated with preferences 
for the working sector, while regional dummies are likely to capture the 
greater availability of jobs in certain sectors in specific areas.
Besides these personal characteristics, a macro variable has been 
added to the explanatory variables. This is the male or female (according 
to the gender of the worker) regional unemployment rate at the time the 
individual entered the sector in which he/she is currently working.12 This 
demand-side variable captures the rationing level in the private sector and 
is therefore expected to significantly explain the entrance opportunities 
into this sector as well as into that of self-employment (insofar as it is a 
free-entry sector which the rationed individual may decide to enter in as a 
“second-best” solution) and possibly into the public sector. In this case,
’^Notice that we do not know if, at the time of the last change, the individual 
entered the sector he/she is at the end of 1993 coming from a different one or sim­
ply changing job inside the same sector. However, we think that this makes little 
difference, given that in any case a new job has been found; in other words, the 
unemployment rate is expected to have the same influence on job opportunities, in­
dependently of the history of the worker, and, more precisely, independently of the 




























































































on the one hand, the government may react to unfavourable economic 
situations by offering additional jobs in the public administration, on the 
other the queues at the entrance into this sector may increase. Moreover, 
because it is a pure demand-side variable, the regional unemployment 
rate at the time of entry into the working sector partly disentangles the 
age effect - i.e. of changing preferences as age changes - from cohort 
effects due to the changing economic background for the different groups 
of workers entering the labour market and the working sector at different 
times.
The series of regional unemployment rates for men and women have 
been taken from Annuario Statistico and Annuario delle Statistiche del 
Lavoro by ISTAT. Unfortunately, the regional unemployment rate by 
sex is regularly available only from 1967 on and for the single years 1952, 
1954, 1962, 1963 before that. Given that many individuals in the sample 
have tenure which is longer than 25 years at end of 1993, we have decided 
to construct the unemployment rate for the missing years from 1952 to 
1967 by linear interpolation13. We think that this solution presents fewer 
drawbacks relative to the alternative one of dropping hundreds of older 
workers from the sample, given that in the ’50s and the ’60s the unem­
ployment rate was quite low everywhere in Italy, with few variations in 
time. Once the series 1952-1993 of the regional unemployment rate have 
been added to the other variables, only a few individuals are excluded 
from the original samples. In Table 3 the actual sample sizes used for 
the estimation of the model are reported.
13We have not extrapolated the regional unemployment rate before 1952 because 
we have only one point in time on which rely (1952) and also because the missing 
years represent in this case the immediate post-war period, which can certainly be 




























































































T able 3. A ctu a l sam ple sizes
By comparing these figures with thoses reported in Table 2, we can see 
that the few excluded individuals are almost all self-employed. Moreover, 
they are obviously all older workers. This small alteration of the sample 
is justified by the great advantage of using the regional unemployment 
rate as an extra macro-variable in the estimation.
Finally, what we need is a sector-specific variable to solve the pro­
blem of tenuous identification illustrated in paragraph 3.1. The solution 
adopted is presented in the following section.
4.3 M od el e stim a tio n
4.3.1 Sector specific variable construction
The nature of the problem with which we are dealing as well as the kind of 
data available imply a model including individual-specific variables only. 
Therefore, difficulties arise in finding alternative-specific variables, which, 
on the contrary, would naturally exist in, for example, transportation- 
choice models. In order to overcome these difficulties, we have decided 
to “create” one sector-specific variable (i.e. a variable taking two diffe­
rent values for each of the two sectors)14 each of these values entering a 
different choice equation.
As a possible solution Heckman-Sedlacek (1985) propose the choice 
of other personal non-labour income, which they estimate as a function of
14Given the way the identification problem has been solved, we need only two 




























































































individual characteristics for each sector.15 They interpret this variable 
as a proxy for the “collateral benefits” of being in a specific sector. On 
the one hand, the other personal non-labour income is expected to enter 
the preference function directly; on the other, it also makes sense to 
assume that each sector offers different opportunities to generate a certain 
amount of other personal non-labour income. In particular, Heckman 
and Sedlacek, who refer to the U.S. labour market, interpret non-labour 
income as all non-employment income, including unemployment benefits 
and social transfers, underlining the fact that entitlements to various 
social programs are conditional on sectoral participation.
A better solution seems to us the choice of predicted earnings. This 
variable has an obvious, more direct interpretation, given that it is one of 
the most important determinants of the utility of choosing one specific 
sector. The problem is that, as for non-labour income, the “potential 
wage” in each sector for every individual is not observable; we observe 
only the actual earnings in the sector chosen. Therefore, we have to 
estimate it.
The estimation of sectoral earnings is affected by selection bias, due 
to the fact that the groups of workers we observe in each sector are not 
random samples of the population, but selected samples of individuals 
who have chosen the sector they are in by maximizing their utility, to 
which the wage gives an important contribution. The estimation of the 
predicted wages has consequently been made by adopting a two-step pro­
cedure, in which, at the first step, the choice of the sector is explained 
and the correction factors computed and, at the second step, a regression 
of wage on human capital explanatory variables and the correction fac­
tors is carried out. The model used is that developed in Bardasi (1996). 
A multinomial logit model has been used at the first step to explain the 
sectoral choice among self-employment, private and public sectors. Even 
if this is a second-best solution (the Hausman test has shown that the
15In other words, they regard each sector as “paying” in a different way all the 
personal characteristics which are useful in producing extra-income, in addition to the 
’’official wage” earned in that sector. The sectors they refer to are the manufacturing, 




























































































IIA property does not hold in this case and, by consequence, that the 
multinomial logit model is not the most appropriate model), it is nevert­
heless a feasible starting point, given the need of correcting for selection 
bias in some way. The problems in estimating self-employment earnings, 
besides private and public wages, are easily avoided given that only two 
alternative-specific variables are needed (one of the three utilities, in the 
present case the utility of choosing self-employment, is set to zero for 
identification reasons).
The results are reported in Tables A.l, A.2 and A.3 in the Ap­
pendix. Tables A.l and A.2 report the results of the multinomial logit 
models and Table A.3 of the wage regressions. Two different specificati­
ons have been found for the two sectors, private and public, as the most 
appropriate ones, both for the multinomial logit model and for wage re­
gressions. Moreover, a separate analysis has been carried out for men 
and women, given that the behaviour of the two genders is expected to 
be considerably different in terms of choice of the working sector.
The dependent variable in the wage equations is the logarithm of 
the “hourly wage in the main sector earned in year 1993”. The explana­
tory variables are the typical human capital variables (education level, 
tenure with the present employer, experience before the present job), the 
geographical and sectoral dummies and the interaction terms between 
all these explanatory variables and a dummy for blue collars, in order to 
obtain separate coefficients for blue and white collars, given the different 
composition in terms of occupational groups in the two sectors.
On the basis of the estimated wage regressions, the predicted wa­
ges for every individual in the public and the private sector have been 
estimated. The predicted wages in the two sectors have been included 
as choice-specific regressors in a second multinomial logit model, whose 
estimation (step 1 of next section) is aimed at obtaining initial values 
for the estimation of the multinomial probit model. The estimates are 




























































































4.3.2 Probit estim ates
The probit model is specified as described in (3.1) and includes the sector 
specific variables obtained in the previous section in order to insert some 
exclusion restrictions which are necessary for identification. Two separate 
models have been estimated for women (2653 observations) and men 
(4790 observations). In both cases, the estimation has been carried out 
according to the technique illustrated in section (3.3) and involves the 
following three steps.
1. Derivation of the logit estim ates of a three choice model.
This stage, which presents the advantage of an automatically im­
plemented estimation procedure, is essential for the derivation of 
a sensible starting value for the numerical estimation of the para­
meter vector of the probit model in the following step. The utility 
structure underlying the trivariate logit model is the same as the 
probit one (see section (3.1)), i.e. we can write: u[j =  7J+x ' + 1}^, 
j  — 1,2,3, where identification requires some normalization, for 
example 73 =  0, 8 3  =0 . However, the logit model differs from the 
probit one in as far as the distribution of the error terms is concer­
ned. While the probit model postulates the normal distribution of 
the errors, in the logit case, the error terms in the original model 
are assumed to be type 1 extreme value distributed. This distri­
butional assumption has three important consequences: firstly, the 
variance of the differenced error terms, which have logistic distribu­
tion, is equal to \  (and therefore such error terms have the same 
variance); secondly, their covariance is forced to be zero, thirdly, 
the probability that person i will choose sector j ,  Pjj, is charac­
terized by a different functional form, namely?! =  r-fxp*7(+- '6;.* , ,' J V 2Jsexp(7,+ i'6>) ’
j , s  = 1,2,3.
2. Estimation of the trivariate probit with restricted cova­
riance.
This intermediate step consists in estimating the probit analogous 




























































































covariance matrix of the probit error terms (E** in section (3.1)) 
to be the identity matrix, i.e. by imposing unit variance on both 
errors and zero covariance (<Tj* =  = 1, =  0). The logit
estimates can then be used as starting values for the numerical 
procedure described in (3.3) after the transformation which makes 
logit and probit coefficients comparable in this case. Stem (1989) 
generalizes the Amemya’s 1.6 rule (1981)16, valid for comparison of 
the coefficients of bivariate logit and probit models, to multinomial 
models with independent errors. Accordingly, we have adopted 
the comparison factor he suggests for the three-choice case, say 
b3 — 0.55698,17 and we put: a**<0* =  yjb3, — bjb3, j  — 1,2,
where the subscript (0) indicates the initial values used to imple­
ment the numerical maximization of the probit loglikelihood. The 
resulting probit estimates allow for an evaluation of the effect of 
the different assumed functional form on the estimated coefficient 
of the variables, without including the effect of relaxing the cova­
riance structure.
3. Estimation of the trivariate probit model with unrestric­
ted covariance.
The ultimate aim of the estimation procedure is to relax the cons­
traint <7(2 — 0, in order to exploit the advantage in terms of cova­
riance pattern flexibility offered by the probit specification. This 
last estimation is performed by adding the covariance parameter to 
the previous probit parameter vector and using the probit estimates 
obtained at step 2) as starting values (for the covariance parameter 
we put =  0). Although in principle we could estimate the
variance (7.)) as well, we proceeded gradually in the generalization
16According to this rule the logit coefficients multiplied by 1.6 are comparable with 
the probit ones in the bivariate case.
17This value is obtained by dividing the a3 comparison factor in Stern’s notation by 
V2, as its notation refers to the error terms of the original models, while the models 
are expressed in the differences of the error terms, whose variance is two times the 




























































































of the model, and kept the scale restriction a22 =  l .18 This im­
plies that we are in fact estimating the correlation between the two 
normalized utilities, say p\2. In order to achieve the estimation of 
p\2, it was essential to impose the constraint that the correlations 
(Pu P21 P3 ) in the three bivariate normal distributions under in­
tegration in the loglikelihood function (cf. (8)) be less than one in 
modulus. This is easily accomplished when a22 =  1. Given that in
this case we have: p\ =  , 12 -, P2 =Pu Pi =  p\2, the maximi-V2-2<T12
zation can be performed with respect to pi and by imposing it to 
be less than one in modulus.19
Tables A.5 to A.8 of the Appendix display the results correspon­
ding to the above first two steps for the two models (men and women), 
while Table 4 and Table 5 contain the unconstrained covariance probit 
results.20 The reported standard errors of the probit estimates are the 
heteroscedasticity consistent, i.e. the diagonal elements of the matrix 
J j ' / j - J y 1, where It is the outer product of the gradient, evaluated ana­
lytically, and Jt is the negative Hessian matrix, evaluated numerically. 
The analytical expression of the first order derivatives of the probit log- 
likelihood with respect to the parameters is obtained in the same way 
as indicated in Appendix A.4 for the marginal effects of the continuous 
variables.
An inspection of the Tables reveals some important facts. First, the 
predicted wage sector specific variables are strongly significant in both 
the estimated logit and probit. This confirms the theoretical importance 
of including these sector-specific variables in the information set, leaving
18The attempt to release this scale restriction was unsuccessful, despite various 
trials with different numerical maximization algorithms. The estimated parameter 
vector got stuck very close to the starting value (with <j22 =  1), without reaching the 
convergence in 100 iterations.
19The constraint is imposed through the repaxametrization: p$ — .
20 For computational reasons the variables age2, otherfi2 and otherpi2 have been 




























































































the need for them to the probit estimation to one side. Second, it can be 
remarked that the separate effect of a different functional form is not ne­
gligible. Tables A.5 and A.6, and Tables A.7 and A.8 do in fact differ as 
far as the significance of some regressors is concerned. Further differences 
in the regression coefficients also appear in the comparison between Ta­
ble A.6 and 4, and Table A.8 and 5 respectively, corresponding to the 
effect of releasing the constraint p\2 — 0. These changes are commen­
ted on and interpreted in more detail in the following section. It can 
be observed that the estimated correlation between the two normalized 
utilities has a high negative value and is fairly significant in both women 
and men models. This means that the hypothesis of IIA is rejected by 
our data. The inadequacy of imposing a zero correlation is confirmed by 
the loglikelihood ratio for the test on the restriction p\2 = 0. Denoting 
by / the estimated unrestricted loglikelihood and by lw the restricted-"tri —
one for women, and with l and lm the same quantities for men, we 
have:
LR\^.=0) =  2 (r  -  P-) =  55.38 
LR^..=0) =  2(fm -  r  ) =  186.55
which, confronted with the critical value 0 05) =  3.84, highlights the 
significant increase in the loglikelihood obtained by releasing the cova­




























































































Log likelihood=-3713.80, 4790 obs.
___________ Stars denote unsignificance at 5% level.___________
Table 4. U n con stra in ed  covariance p rob it e s tim a tes .21 M en
V ariable CoefF. S.E . CoefF. S.E.
Private Public
age 0.1921 0.0177 0.0790 0.0161
age2/1000 -2.010 0.1990 -0.7700 0.1864
educ2 0.1922 0.0675 0.4763 0.0714
educ3 0.7631 0.0872 0.2855 0.0864
educ4 0.2135* 0.1325 0.2169* 0.1729
North-W est 0.8446 0.0731 -0.4947 0.0729
North-East 0.6379 0.0740 -0.3959 0.0735
Centre 0.3624 0.0666 -0.1714 0.0638
otherfi 0.0040 0.0017 0.0048 0.0018
wealth -0.6721 0.1410 -1.1916 0.1445
wealth2 0.0689 0.0345 0.0955 0.0141
house 0.0944* 0.0531 0.1950 0.0537
nrecip 0.0139* 0.0344 -0.1326 0.0371
otherpi 0.0172 0.0026 0.0040* 0.0027
otherpi2/1000 -0.3221 0.0228 -0.0200* 0.0252





constant 40.4622 1.9298 -10.5067 2.7610
P\2 -0.9531 0.0165




























































































T a b le  5. U n c o s tra in e d  co v a rian c e  p ro b it  e s t im a te s .  W o m en
Log likelihood=-1903.33, 2653 obs.
___________ Stars denote unsignificance at 5% level.___________
V aria b le C oeff. S .E . C oeff. S .E .
Private Public
age 0.0540 0.0239 0.1381 0.0234
age2/1000 -0.8339 0.2938 -1.4533 0.2846
educ2 -0.0934* 0.0941 0.4276 0.1124
educ3 -0.0550* 0.1162 1.1054 0.1624
educ4 -0.1857* 0.2105 0.6166 0.2759
married -0.2387 0.0829 -0.1441* 0.0854
North-W est 0.9199 0.1139 -0.5068 0.1124
North-East 0.6782 0.1151 -0.4930 0.1131
Centre 0.6160 0.1048 -0.3688 0.1007
otherfi 0.0081 0.0033 0.0078 0.0031
otherfi2/1000 -0.0409 0.0192 -0.0255* 0.0185
wealth -0.7030 0.1869 -1.3060 0.1725
wealth2 0.1004 0.0266 0.1371 0.0311
house 0.0497* 0.0764 0.2420 0.0778
nrecip -0.0332* 0.0463 -0.1354 0.0455
otherpi 0.0490 0.0110 -0.0009* 0.0085





headfam -0.4310 0.1175 0.0924* 0.1224
runrate -2.2180 0.5798 -1.3808 0.5727





























































































4.4 In terp reta tion  o f  resu lts
4.4.1 Comparison between logit and probit estimates
As a first indicator of the performance of the model, we have chosen to 
tabulate the actual choices versus the predicted choices. On the basis of 
the predicted probabilities of being in one of the three sectors, we have 
placed the individual in that for which the predicted probability was the 
highest. The results are reported in the Tables 6 and 7, while Table 8 re­
ports some indices which are useful in summarizing the results. In these, 
we are comparing the multinomial logit model and the unconstrained 
multinomial probit. The two models do not differ much under the profile 
of the allocation of the workers across the three sectors on the basis of 
the above reported procedure.22




priv. pubi. s.e. tot. priv. pubi. s.e. tot.
priv. 1869 280 129 2278 832 220 42 1084
publ. 533 678 112 1323 279 719 55 1053
s.e. 304 287 598 1189 110 125 281 516
tot. 2706 1245 839 4790 1221 1054 378 2653
22It is worth considering that, even when the predicted probabilities generated by 
the two models differ considerably, the allocation of the worker in one of the three 
sectors does not vary unless the change in the probabilities is big enough to modify 
their ranking (for example, from Pr(PU)>Pr(PR)>Pr(SE) generated by the logit 
to Pr(PR)>Pr(PU)>Pr(SE) generated by the probit). This is why the tabulation 
’’observed vs. predicted cases” is only one possible but imperfect measure of the 
































































































priv. pubi. s.e. tot. priv. pubi. s.e. tot.
priv. 1842 250 186 2278 833 197 54 1084
pubi. 521 641 161 1323 278 709 66 1053
s.e. 283 228 678 1189 106 115 295 516
tot. 2646 1119 1025 4790 1217 1021 415 2653
The unconstrained multinomial probit allocates more easily the workers 
in the category “self-employment” than the multinomial logit model and 
this is reflected both in the higher percentage of self-employed classified 
as self-employed and in the lower rate of predicted self-employed who 
are actually self-employed (indicating that the increase of the former 
percentage is made, at least in part, at the expenses of a higher number 
of mistakes). However, we think that the increase in the easiness in 
predicting self-employment should be regarded as a positive feature given 
that this is one option with a low rate of cases correctly classified.23
Table 8. C om parison  o f  the perform an ce  o f  logit and probit
m odels.
MEN WOMEN
logit probit logit probit
% of private classified private 82.05 80.86 76.75 76.84
% of public classified public 51.25 48.45 68.28 67.33
% of self-empl. classified self-empl. 50.29 57.02 54.46 57.17
% of to t. obs. correctly classified 65.66 65.99 69.05 69.24
% of predicted private actually private 69.07 69.61 68.14 68.45
% of predicted public actually public 54.46 57.28 68.22 69.44
% of predicted self-empl. actually self-empl. 71.27 66.15 74.34 71.08
23 Another control of the performance of the two models has been carried out by 
comparing the probabilities predicted by the logit and the probit for the actual status 
of the worker. In the large majority of the cases the probit model generates a higher 





























































































More interesting is to compare the marginal effects and the elasticities of 
the explanatory variables. Both for the multinomial logit and the uncons­
trained multinomial probit, we have computed and indicated separately 
the “direct” and the “total” effects of a change of one continuous ex­
planatory variable on the probability of entering either one or the other 
sector.24
As explained in more detail in Appendix A.l, the “direct” effect 
does not take into account the change in the probability due to the va­
riation of the predicted earnings, when the explanatory variable in que­
stion also enters the wage regressions and/or the first multinomial logit 
which is used to compute the selection bias, while the “total” effect does. 
In Tables 9 through 12 the marginal effects and the elasticities for the 
multinomial logit model and the unconstrained (p /()) multinomial pro­
bit model are shown. The differences between the two models are now 
clearer.
Table 9. Marginal effects and elasticities. Logit model, Men.
Direct effect Total effect
Variable P(private) P(public) P( private) P(public)
M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast
age 0.0040 1.4745 0.0018 0.1264 0.0010 0.3640 0.0041 0.2824
oth. fam. inc. 0.0004 0.0689 0.0040 0.1348 0.0006 0.1137 0.0039 0.1312
oth. per. inc. 0.0016 0.1137 0.0027 0.0361 0.0036 0.2557 0.0014 0.0185
family wealth -0.0376 -0.0939 -0.6950 -0.3231 -0.1114 -0.2777 -0.6559 -0.3052
unempl. rate -1.2429 -1.3848 0.6025 0.1248 -1.3833 -1.5409 0.6868 0.1421
lnwagepr -0.5470 0.3551
lnwagepu -0.1209 0.4730
24 The marginal effects and elasticities have been computed in correspondence of 




























































































Table 10. Marginal effects and elasticities. Probit model, Men.
Direct effect Total effect
Variable P(private) P(public) P(private) P( public)
M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast
age 0.0065 2.0298 0.0069 0.5093 0.0019 0.6059 0.0075 0.5567
oth. fam. inc. 0.0008 0.1288 0.0019 0.0687 0.0012 0.1929 0.0020 0.0719
oth. per. inc. 0.0025 0.1537 0.0015 0.0208 0.0057 0.3438 0.0014 0.0198
family wealth -0.1310 -0.2808 -0.4523 -0.2249 -0.2518 -0.5396 -0.4708 -0.2341
unempl. rate -1.2954 -1.2366 1.0867 0.2408 -1.5195 -1.4506 1.0724 0.2376
lnwagepr -0.8610 0.0002
lnwagepu - 0.0001 0.8105
Table 11. Marginal effects and elasticities. Logit model. Women.
Direct effect Total effect
Variable P(private) P(public) P( private) P(public)
M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M.. eff. Elast
age -0.0031 -1.0867 0.0041 0.1884 -0.0049 -1.7171 0.0056 0.2587
oth. fam. inc. 0.0001 0.0538 0.0013 0.0614 0.0002 0.0764 0.0012 0.0581
oth. per. inc. 0.0053 0.0833 -0.0018 -0.0037 0.0053 0.0832 -0.0018 -0.037
family wealth 0.0276 0.0736 -0.2391 -0.0846 0.0120 0.0319 -0.2234 -0.0791
unempl. rate -0.0958 -0.1054 -0.2671 -0.0390 -0.0793 -0.0872 -0.2769 -0.0405
lnwagepr -0.2280 0.2101
lnwagepu -0.1974 0.3236
Table 12. Marginal effects and elasticities. Probit model, Women.
Direct effect Total effect
Variable Pfprivate) P(public) P(private) P(public)
M. eff. Elast. M.. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast. M. eff. Elast
age -0.0030 -0.8308 0.0077 0.3819 -0.0062 -1.7369 0.0080 0.3950
oth. fam. inc. 0.0006 0.1673 0.0013 0.0649 0.0007 0.1915 0.0012 0.0614
oth. pers. inc. 0.0082 0.1033 -0.0024 -0.0053 0.0082 0.1033 -0.0024 -0.0053
family wealth -0.0554 -0.1183 -0.2917 -0.1103 -0.0800 -0.1706 -0.2806 -0.1061
unempl. rate -0.3258 -0.2868 -0.2574 -0.0402 -0.2901 -0.2554 -0.2455 -0.0383
lnwagepr -0.3813 0.1027
lnwagepu -0.1107 0.6117
It can be seen that the two models produce elasticities that differ con­




























































































the “total” elasticity of age for men and of wealth for women. The un­
constrained multinomial probit, moreover, produces, in general, greater 
marginal effects and elasticities than the multinomial logit. A compa­
rison between the direct and the total elasticities shows the importance 
of taking into account any additional effect of the same variable that 
- via the predicted wages - may compensate or amplify the magnitude 
of the direct derivative. Differences between the multinomial logit and 
the multinomial probit model are also evident as far as the dummies are 
concerned. In this case, to measure the effect of the categorical variables, 
one dummy has been changed - in turn - keeping all the other characte­
ristics fixed at their average level. The results are reported in Tables 13 
and 14. The variations are noticeable, especially for men, and for some 
variables (see, for example, the change in probabilities due to all levels 
of education - especially that of the degree - and to the variations in the 
composition of the family as far as the “active” members are concerned, 
for men, and to primary education, to house ownership and to marital 
status, for women).
Table 13. C hanges in probabilities due to changes in the 
_______ categorica l variables. M en._______________
V ariable Logit P rob it
Pfpriv.) P(publ.) P(s.e.) P(priv.) P(publ.) P(s.e.)
average individual 0.1076 0.5793 0.3131 0.1257 0.5416 0.3327
no ednc.-prim. educ. 0.0877 0.3790 0.5333 0.0903 0.3550 0.5547
high school 0.2426 0.5075 0.2499 0.2820 0.4653 0.2527
degree 0.1707 0.3768 0.4525 0.1301 0.4384 0.4315
1 income recipient 0.0985 0.6439 0.2576 0.1228 0.5937 0.2835
3 income recipient 0.1155 0.5112 0.3733 0.1286 0.4888 0.3827
North West 0.2970 0.3636 0.3394 0.3809 0.3479 0.2712
North East 0.2376 0.3947 0.3677 0.3053 0.3853 0.3094
Centre 0.1717 0.5171 0.3112 0.2163 0.4733 0.3104




























































































T able 14. C han ges in p rob ab ilities due to  ch an ges in  th e
categorica l variables. W om en .
V ariable Logit P rob it
P(priv.) P(publ.) P(s.e.) Pfpriv.) P(publ.) P(s.e.)
average individual 0.1091 0.8211 0.0698 0.1362 0.7688 0.0950
compulsory educ. 0.1759 0.5542 0.2699 0.1461 0.5417 0.3122
primary educ. 0.2248 0.3737 0.4015 0.1707 0.3749 0.4544
degree 0.1395 0.7085 0.1520 0.1249 0.6148 0.2603
non married 0.1174 0.8483 0.0343 0.1689 0.7872 0.0439
1 income recipient 0.1024 0.8435 0.0541 0.1346 0.8002 0.0652
3 income recipient 0.1156 0.7949 0.0895 0.1358 0.7322 0.1320
North West 0.3909 0.5299 0.0792 0.3961 0.5456 0.0583
North East 0.3196 0.5744 0.1060 0.3282 0.5768 0.0950
Centre 0.2815 0.6266 0.0919 0.2995 0.6202 0.0803
headfam of the family 0.0662 0.8342 0.0996 0.0695 0.8063 0.1242
House not owned 0.1253 0.7727 0.1020 0.1361 0.6996 0.1643
4.4.2 Some evidence on the choice of the sector
Let us now examine in more detail the results already presented in the 
previous tables. In this section, we refer exclusively to the estimates ob­
tained by using the most appropriate model, i.e. the multinomial probit 
model. Looking at Table 10 for men and Table 12 for women, at the 
elasticities corresponding to the total effect of a change in a continuous 
variable, the strong effect of the age variable is evident. This effect is 
clearly negative for the probability of being in the private sector as far 
as female workers are concerned, while it is moderately positive for men. 
Together with the positive elasticities of the probabilities of being in the 
public sector, both for men and for women, this contributes to a nega­
tive elasticity of the probability of being self-employed with respect to 
age for both genders, which is especially strong for men and almost close 
to zero for women. This result may appear counter-intuitive; we would 
expect to observe younger workers entering more easily into the private 
sector and moving to self-employment as physical and human capital 
are accumulated. However, the elasticities we have computed cannot be 




























































































age levels.25 In fact, they are computed for a specific type of individual, 
i.e. they represent the effect of changing age, keeping fixed all the other 
characteristics at the “average” type.
In order to gain more insights about the effect of age on the proba­
bility of being in a certain sector, we have depicted the predicted proba­
bilities for specific types of individuals. In Figure 1 the case is presented 
of a man and a woman living in the North-West of Italy with a low wealth 
level (100 million Lit.) and at an unemployment rate of 12%.
•9» > 9*
The two graphs at the top are drawn on the basis of the coefficients 
estimated using the probit model presented in the preceeding sections 
(let us call this model UR). The two graphs at the bottom refer to the 
same model in which, however, the regional unemployment rate has not 
been included among the regressors (let us call this model NUR).26
25 The hystograms - not reported here - representing the sector partecipation fre­
quencies by age display for both genders a trend which is monotonously decreasing in 
the private sector and monotonously increasing in the self-employment. In the public 
sector it is increasing until 40 for men and 33 for women, then it remains, more or 
less constant, to begin decreasing after 60.
26These estimates have been obtained in a preliminary phase of this study. They 




























































































It can be observed that in the case of men both graphs can be ver­
tically “split” into two parts. In the last 20-25 years of the life-cycle the 
probabilities follow the “expected” pattern, i.e. the probability of being 
in the private sector decreases and that of being self-employed increases. 
However, in the first 20-25 years this pattern is reversed. Interestingly, 
the graph derived from the NUR model displays more pronounced cur­
vatures of the private and self-employment profiles than those derived 
from the UR model. Moreover, in the graphs based on the UR model 
the overall level of the predicted probabilities also changes.
The graphs referring to the male worker show the effect of the regio­
nal unemployment rate at the time of entering the sector. When using a 
cross-section, in fact, the variations in the probability of being in a sector 
as age varies also incorporate cohort effects and capture macroeconomic 
events and policy interventions which have affected the size of the sector 
in specific periods. In the case of the average man, the increase in the 
probability of being in the private sector as age increases, or rather, the 
decrease of this probability as age decreases, is amplified by the incre­
ase of the unemployment rate for the youngest cohorts, particularly at 
low education levels, as the graphs drawn on the basis of NUR model 
(which does not take into account the variation of the unemployment 
rate for different cohorts) demonstrate. Accordingly, the probability of 
being self-employed increases when the individual is younger also because 
self-employment is the only possible alternative in such a situation. Once 
the regional unemployment rate is taken into account, part of this cohort 
effect disappears. Obviously, the variation in the regional unemployment 
rate is only one of the possible elements introducing cohort effects, even 
if, we think, it is a very important one. It is interesting to notice that 
the younger workers are with higher and increasing probabilities self- 
employed, even when accounting for the regional unemployment rate. 
This may reflect the general trend recorded in many European countries 
of increasing self-employment rates; in Italy, specific incentives for young 
entrepreneurs have been introduced in the last few years, representing 
another explanation for the increasingly common attitude of looking at 




























































































In the case of women, as opposed to man, the introduction of the 
regional unemployment rate does not produce significant changes in the 
pattern of the predicted probabilities by age. In fact, in both the UR 
and the NUR models female workers show behaviour that is more similar 
to that which has been indicated as intuitive, with decreasing predicted 
probabilities of being in the private sector and increasing predicted pro­
babilities of being self-employed on the whole age range. In this case, the 
introduction of the regional unemployment rate does not modify the co­
efficient of age to any significant degree. A possible explanation for this 
could be connected with the increase in the participation of women to 
the labour force. Even if the female unemployment rate has considerably 
increased and now reaches levels which are in all regions on average twice 
the corresponding figure for men, it is also true that the private sector 
has hired an increasing number of women.27 Therefore, the probability 
that a woman aged 20 is in the private sector is higher than that of a wo­
man aged 30, even when the variations of the unemployment rate are not 
taken into account, as in the NUR model. We can also notice that, for 
the youngest female worker, some slightly increasing predicted probabi­
lities of being self-employed as their age decreases are observed. It might 
be that, as regards the choice of self-employment, women follow with 
delay the behaviour of men (i.e. the youngest women start considering 
self-employment as a possible first job in their working lives).
As expected, for both genders, the probability of being in the public 
sector increases with age (there are age barriers at the entrance into the 
public sector due to the presence of minimum requirements in terms 
of education level and age) and reaches a peak at 50-55 (the number of 
public workers increased in the 1970s following the creation of new public 
administrations and the enlargement of the already existing bodies).
Let us come back to Table 10 and 12 to examine the effect of the 
regional unemployment rate. For men, this effect on the probability of 
being in the private sector is strongly negative, meaning that a higher
27In other words, the dramatic increase in the female unemployment rate is explai­
ned by the fact that women have entered the labour market much faster them the 




























































































unemployment rate corresponds to fewer opportunities of finding a job 
in the private sector due to a reduced capacity of this sector to offer jobs. 
In consequence, the alternantives - with positive elasticities - are those 
offered by self-employment and public sector; this latter has been purpo­
sely enlarged by the government in periods of increasing unemployment 
and in regions with high unemployment rates. In the case of women, 
on the contrary, the regional unemployment rate produces much smaller 
effects. Elasticity for the private sector is negative, but much lower than 
in the case of men; for the public sector it is almost zero and it is positive 
for self-employment. The fact that all these effects are, for women, quite 
small supports the previously presented argument that the unemploy­
ment rate should be interpreted differently for men and women. In the 
case of men this is almost completely due to changes in the demand-side 
of the labour market, i.e. to a reduction of the total number of male 
employees, while in the case of women it is due to changes in both the 
demand-side and the supply-side. In this case it could be compatible 
with an increasing or constant number of places available in the private 
sector for female workers.
The effect due to variation in family wealth is negative for the pri­
vate and public sectors, and for both genders, as expected, and probably 
indicates the existence of financial barriers in entering self-employment; 
as wealth increases, the probability of being self-employed also increases.
As far as the effect of the presence of other sources of income in 
the family is concerned, we have two variables on which to rely: the 
number of other income recipients and the total amount of other family 
earnings. The increase in the number of other income recipients increases 
the probability of being self-employed and decreases that of being public 
workers, both for men and women (see Table 13 and Table 14 respec­
tively). This result may be due to behaviour which is aimed at reducing 
the risk (and therefore the self-employed choice is possible only if there 
are other income recipients in the family), but also to the specific way 
of organizing the productive activity by the self-employed, i.e. in the 




























































































of family enterprises represent a large proportion of the self-employed.28 
When looking at the effect of the total annual amount of income ear­
ned by other family members we are probably surprised by the negative 
sign of the elasticity in the case of self-employment, for both men and 
women (see Table 10 and Table 12 respectively), which means that wor­
kers whose family can rely on less additional financial support are more 
likely self-employed. However, a negative sign is compatible with the 
explanation of the existence of many self-employed people who are mem­
bers of family enterprises; the family enterprises - active in sectors like 
agricolture and trade - declare very low income levels.
The increase in other personal earnings has a positive effect on the 
probability of being both in the private and in the public sector and a 
negative effect on the probability of being self-employed. Unfortunately, 
we do not know the nature if these earnings (income from a second job, 
pensions, interests from bonds, dividends, etc.). Anyway, it is likely that 
a worker whose main job is self-employed activity has only this job;29 
moreover, he will probably invest the profits in his activity. This is 
a possible explanation for the negative elasticity of the other personal 
earnings on the probability of being self-employed.
It is interesting to examine the effect of changes in the education 
level. For both the typical man and woman, the probability of being self- 
employed is the highest at very low and very high levels of education. 
This highlights the existence of a great heterogeneity inside the group 
of the self-employed. In fact, the level of education varies considerably 
across the various categories of the self-employed, from the very low 
level typical of the members of family enterprises and enterpreneurs to 
the highest levels which characterize the professionals. For women, high 
levels of education considerably increase the probability of having a job 
in the public sector.
The highest probability of being in the public sector when living in
28In our sample more than one fourth of all self-employed are members of family
enterprises.
29 An individual who is an employee and self-employed will probably declare himself 




























































































the South is clearly confirmed for women and also for men; Southern male 
workers, however, have also a high probability of being self-employed, 
while the female average worker has the highest probability of being 
self-employed when living in the North-East. The highest probability 
of working in the private sector corresponds, for both genders, to the 
North-West of the country.
If we associate an increase of risk to situations like “house not 
owned” and “being head of the family”, we will notice - consistently with 
our expectations - an increase in the probability of being self-employed, 
the status requiring the highest “risk propensity”, both for men and for 
women.
4.4.3 A possible interpretation for rho
What is left, at this point, is an attempt to interpret rho. In our estimated 
model, rho is the correlation between the the difference between the 
utility of being private and the utility of being self-employed and the 
difference between the utility of being public and the utility of being self- 
employed,30 conditional on the explanatory variables, i.e. once the effect 
of the regressors has been taken into account.
For both genders this correlation is strongly negative. This fact 
indicates that the more the worker “confuses” the utility of being self- 
employed and the utility of working in the private sector, the more he 
distinguishes between the utility of being self-employed and the utility 
of working in the public sector and vice versa. In other words, when 
the self-employedactivity and the private job are considered as very close 
in terms of preferences, the public job is regarded as strongly “far”, i.e. 
strongly different from the self-employment and therefore from the pri­
vate job. The negative sign of rho implies that the opposite is also true, 
even if, from the economic point of view, the interpretation of this se­
cond case is more arduous. In fact, a certain closeness between private
30The correlation in terms of differences between utilities arises because of the 




























































































job and self-employedactivity is a predictable result . Both sectors are ge­
nerally characterized by scope for personal initiative, possibility of career, 
greater motivation and responsibility in comparison with the public job. 
Similarities between self-employment and the public job, on the contrary, 
are difficult to find. However, a negative correlation does not mean that 
both polar cases are equally likely; the first case is in our view the most 
sensible situation. Moreover, in both cases an evident distance between 
the public and the private sector worker type is clearly predicted.
This result seems to us very interesting. A priori, in fact, one could 
expect to find similarities between the private and the public job in that 
they are both employed job. The distinction between self-employedand 
employed job emphasises the existence of financial constraints as the 
crucial reason for entering the one or the other sector. Looking at the 
estimated rho, instead, a diversity of the public versus the private job 
clearly arises and this indicates that family wealth is only one of the 
relevant explanatory variables and that other personal characteristics are 
more important in determining the “worker type”.
5 Conclusions
This attempt to analyse the workers’ occupational choice offers an answer 
to several questions, but at the same time widens the scope for further 
investigations. Among the main findings, the one which seems to us to 
be the most relevant is the existence of a negative correlation between 
the utility of working in the private sector and the utility of working 
in the public sector, conditional on the explanatory variables entering 
the model. Although this result is in accordance with a general a-priori 
expectation, it is nevertheless interesting to find that the data strongly 
support this intuition. The possibility of defining the sectors according 
to the legal nature of the employer is also confirmed by the significance 
of many variables in the probit equation. Even if rationing situations 
have not been taken into account, a certain degree of similarity among 




























































































Possible extensions suggested by the results obtained so far include, 
for women, the consideration of a fourth, relevant choice, namely, to 
stay out of the labour force. It is in fact evident that, especially in 
certain areas (such as, for example, the South, which is characterized by 
a high unemployment rate), many women decide not to work instead of 
accepting a job in a non-preferred sector. Another possible development 
of this work would consist in enlarging the number of alternatives by 
disaggregating the three sectors considered in homogeneous occupational 
groups, such as, for example, white and blue collars, or in working time 





























































































A .l  List o f variables























age of individual at 31.12.1993 
age squared
dum m y=l if the individual owns risky assets (shares, fondi comuni, etc.) 
dum m y^l if the individual is a blue-collar worker 
no. of non-earners/no. of to tal members in the family 
no. of children aged less than 6 in the family
dummy—1 if the ind. lives in a comune with less than 20.000 inhab.
dummy—1 if the ind. lives in a comune with 20.000 to 40.000 inhab.
dum m y=l if the ind. lices in a  comune with 40.000 to 500.000 inhab.
dum m y=l if the individual has a t most the primary education level
dum m y=l if the individual has a t most the high school education level
dum m y=l if individual has a degree or a post-graduated education level
dum m y=l if the individual lives in the North-W est of Italy
dum m y=l if individual lives in the North-East of Italy
dummy=1 if individual lives in Central Italy
dum m y=l if the individual is the head of the family
dummy=1 if the ind. owns at least 50% of the house in which he lives
dum m y=l if the individual is a manager or a top manager
dum m y=l if the individual is married or livetoghether with a  patner
dum m y=l if the ind. has changed job at least 3 times in his work, career
total number of income recipients in the family
total annual amount of all other family income,




total annual amount of all other personal income of the individual, 









years of to tal work experience at the time of starting the present job 
prevexp squared
predicted hourly wage in the private sector (logarithm of thousand Lit.) 
pwagepr squared





































































































regional male/female unempl. rate a t the tim e of starting the present job 
dum m y=l if the ind. works in agricolture
dum m y=l if the ind. works in the banking and insurance sectors 
dum m y=l if the ind. works in the education and health sectors 
number of total years worked in the present job or activity 
tenure squared
total amount of wealth at 31.12.1993, in billion Lit.





























































































A .2 M u ltin om ia l logit resu lts for p red iction  o f
w ages
Table A .l:m u ltin om ia l logit estim ates - m en 1
Loglikelihood=-4291.54, 4800 obs., Pseudo R2 -  0 1521
Variable C oeff. S.E. z Coeff. S.E. z
Private Public
age -0.1299 0.0271 -0.479 0.1605 0.331 4.846
age2 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.749 -0.0015 0.0004 -4.223
educ2 0.0564 0.1100 0.513 1.3220 0.1380 9.581
educ3 0.2174 0.1184 1.836 1.8071 0.1443 12.516
educ4 -0.4348 0.1788 -2.432 2.3012 0.1807 12.729
headfam -0.5529 0.1303 -4.244 -0.0335 0.1509 -0.222
North-W est 0.3108 0.1406 2.210 -0.6547 0.1544 -4.239
North-East 0.0881 0.1448 0.608 -0.5920 0.1564 -3.785
Centre 0.1739 0.1294 1.344 -0.1173 0.1355 -0.866
otherfi 0.0137 0.0024 5.698 0.0152 0.0029 5.278
otherpi 0.0590 0.0076 7.798 0.0257 0.0067 3.797
otherpi2 -0.0006 0.00007 -5.494 - 0.0 0 0 1 0.0 0 0 1 -2.436
wealth -3.6732 0.2169 -16.938 -3.6823 0.2492 -14.777
wealth2 0.3576 0.0301 11.860 0.3033 0.0318 9.542
house 0.3030 0.0962 3.150 0.4299 0.1078 3.988
mobil 0.4724 0.1150 4.106 0.0617 0.1344 0.459
burden 0.9947 0.1824 5.452 1.1325 0.2056 5.508
child6 -0.4580 0.0851 -5.381 -0.2401 0.0896 -2.678
runrate -4.9629 1.5939 -3.114 -4.0424 1.7222 -2.347
constant 1.8963 0.5936 3.195 -4.6713 0.7474 -6.250
1 Equation 1 corresponds to the private sector, Equation 2 to the public sector, the 




























































































T able A .2: m ultinom ial logit estim ates - w om en
Loglikelihood—-2078.37. 2667 obs.PseudoR2 =  0.2587
Variable C oeff. S.E. z C oeff. S.E. z
Private Public
age 0.0097 0.0430 0.227 0.1949 0.0460 4.240
age 2 -0.0009 0.0005 -1.668 -0.0021 0.0005 -3.948
educ2 -0.2431 0.1755 -1.385 0.9460 0.2096 4.514
educ3 0.2016 0.1974 1.021 2.8294 0.2188 12.932
educ4 -0.7989 0.2999 -2.664 3.2181 0.2741 11.741
com unel -0.4961 0.1400 -3.543 -0.4468 0.1496 -2.987
married -0.9131 0.1601 -5.703 -0.7559 0.1680 -4.500
North-W est 0.4291 0.2148 1.998 -0.7201 0.2111 -3.412
North-East -0.0122 0.2156 -0.057 -0.9427 0.2127 -4.432
Centre 0.2809 0.1913 1.468 -0.6942 0.1887 -3.679
otherfi 0.0377 0.0065 5.785 0.0346 0.0067 5.124
otherfi2 -0.0002 0.00004 -4.207 -0.0001 0.00004 -3.340
wealth -3.9618 0.3157 -12.550 -3.4683 0.3105 -11.169
wealth2 0.5638 0.0688 8.198 0.4401 0.0656 6.704
house 0.5268 0.1476 3.568 0.5153 0.1553 3.318
assets 0.3752 0.2059 1.822 -0.2549 0.2104 -1.212
nrecip -0.0660 0.0894 -0.738 -0.3007 0.0989 -3.042
runrate -4.6600 1.0207 -4.566 -6.0488 1.0070 -6.007




























































































T able A .3: w age regression  - m en
Private sect.: 2273 obs., ad. R2 =  0.46.
Public sect.: 1317 obs., ad. R2 =
O . M . T h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s t h e l o g a r i t h m o f t h e o b s e r v e d h o u r l y w a g e i n t h e p r i v a t e a n d p u b l i
V ariable C oeff. S .E . Coeff. S .E .
P r i v a t e P u b l ic
lambda 0.2334 0.0359 -0.0354 0.0381
educ2 0.1015 0.0787 0.1138 0.0555
educ3 0.2000 0.0773 0.2464 0.0578
educ4 0.3110 0.0887 0.5717 0.0671
tenure 0.0221 0.0040 0.0212 0.0038
tenure2 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
prevexp 0.0104 0.0017 0.0095 0.0033
prevexp2 -0.0004 0.0001
North-West 0.1987 0.0350 0.0214 0.0324
North-East 0.1340 0.0364 0.0531 0.0313




blue -0.1843 0.0897 0.1216 0.1030
educ2*b. -0.0709 0.0815 -0.0391 0.0699
educ3*b. -0.0638 0.0831 -0.0911 0.0913
educ4*b. -0.5805 0.3389 -0.5958 0.3153
tenure*b. 0.0092 0.0047 -0.1308 0.0076
tenure2*b. -0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
prevexp*b. -0.0049 0.0019 -0.0087 0.0068
prevexp2*b. 0.0003 0.0002
North-West*b. 0.0609 0.0400 0.0557 0.0659
North-East*b. 0.1113 0.0422 0.0044 0.0597
Centre*b. 0.0926 0.0334 0.0084 0.0534




























































































Table A .4: Private wage regression - w om en
Private sect.: 1078 obs., ad. R2 =  0.34.
Public sect.: 1051 obs., ad. R2 =  0.42.
V ariable C oeff. S.E. C oeff. S.E.
Private. Public
lambda 0.2305 0.0419 0.0588 0.0453
educ2 0.2269 0.0924
educ3 0.4497 0.0975
educ4 0.3167 0.0705 0.8238 0.1057
tenure 0.0267 0.0063 0.0203 0.0040
tenure2 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001
prevexp 0.0182 0.0066 -0.0083 0.0049
prevexp2 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
North-W est 0.1959 0.0518 -0.0765 0.0307
North-East 0.1782 0.0522 -0.0653 0.0315
Centre 0.1343 0.0525 -0.0144 0.1423
comune 1 0.0377 0.0603









tenure*b. -0.0167 0.0080 -0.0038 0.0127
tenure2*b. 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004
prevexp*b. -0.0123 0.0081 -0.0023 0.0109
prevexp2*b. 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0004
North-W est*b. 0.3114 0.0697 0.0894 0.0849
North-East*b. 0.2627 0.0715 0.2183 0.0962
Centre*b. 0.2064 0.0713 0.2074 0.0896
comune l*b. -0.0236 0.0926
comune2* b. 0.2069 0.0926
comune3*b. 0.1355 0.0852
sectagric*b. -0.4274 0.0456




























































































A .3 M u ltin om ia l logit and con stra in ed  covariance  
probit resu lts
Table A .5: logit estim ates2 - m en
Loglikelihood= -3863.32, 4790 obs. 
Stars denote unsignificance at 5% level.
V ariable C oeff. S.E. C oeff. S.E.
Private Public
age 0.3447 0.0325 0.1652 0.0342
age2 -3.6157 0.3724 -1.7940 0.3885
educ2 0.7379 0.1300 0.9570 0.1489
educ3 1.7760 0.1612 1.0501 0.1830
educ4 0.8305 0.2516 0.1585* 0.3346
North-W est 0.9341 0.1504 -0.5463 0.1532
North-East 0.6307 0.1530 -0.5443 0.1540
Centre 0.4730 0.1377 -0.1073* 0.1345
otherfi 0.0175 0.0031 0.0209 0.0034
wealth -2.8402 0.2391 -3.6989 0.2535
wealth2 0.2821 0.0378 0.2972 0.0293
house 0.3509 0.1025 0.5174 0.1085
nrecip -0.1060* 0.0659 -0.3009 0.0737
otherpi 0.0378 0.0056 0.0208 0.0061
otherpi2 -0.5854 0.0588 -0.1418 0.0628





constant 65.2070 2.7849 15.3602 4.6158
2In this table and in the following Table A.6 the variables age2 and otherpi2 have 




























































































T able A .6: con stra in ed  covariance probit e s tim a tes  - m en
Loglikelihood=3807.073, 4790 obs.
____________ Stars denote unsignificance at 5% level.________ ____
V ariable St. Val. C oeff. S .E . S t. val. Coeff. S .E .
Private Public
age 0.1920 0.2133 0.0182 0.0920 0.0902 0.0187
age2/1000 -2.0139 -2.2139 0.2052 -0.9992 -0.9472 0.2143
educ2 0.4110 0.3794 0.0707 0.5330 0.5392 0.0801
educ3 0.9892 1.0314 0.0931 0.5849 0.5083 0.0992
educ4 0.4626 0.4883 0.1470 0.0883 0.1175* 0.2003
North-W est 0.5202 0.6988 0.0804 -0.3043 -0.4050 0.0827
North-East 0.3513 0.4969 0.0806 -0.3032 -0.3664 0.0833
Centre 0.2634 0.3195 0.0721 -0.0597 -0.1115* 0.0726
otherfi 0.0098 0.0081 0.0018 0.0116 0.0095 0.0019
wealth -1.5820 -1.2210 0.1473 -2.0603 -1.7191 0.1799
wealth2 0.1571 0.1264 0.0223 0.1655 0.1391 0.0169
house 0.1954 0.1431 0.0569 0.2882 0.2427 0.0640
nrecip -0.0590 -0.0423* 0.0368 -0.1676 -0.1622 0.0406
otherpi 0.02108 0.0213 0.0029 0.0116 0.0092 0.0033
otherpi2/1000 -0.3261 -0.3571 0.0224 -0.0790 -0.0531* 0.0325
runrate -7.5734 -7.5901 1.0140 -0.5595 0.8958* 1.0660
pwagepr -30.5014 -35.0997 1.5218
pwagepr2 5.6292 6.4055 0.2980
pwagepu -9.4805 -6.2247 2.2149
pwagepu2 2.1157 1.5360 0.4470




























































































Table A .7: logit estim ates3 - w om en
Loglikelihood= -1963.48, 2653 obs. 
Stars denote unsignificance a t 5% level.
V ariable C oeff. S.E. C oeff. S.E.
Private Public
age 0.1583 0.0487 0.1976 0.0498
age2/1000 -2.2787 0.5942 -2.3550 0.5953
educ2 0.1516* 0.1940 0.7909 0.2249
educ3 1.0280 0.2276 2.5376 0.2964
educ4 0.4947* 0.4023 1.6113 0.4920
married -0.7849 0.1799 -0.7442 0.1832
North-W est 1.1487 0.2422 -0.5650 0.2355
North-East 0.6558 0.2427 -0.7760 0.2322
Centre 0.6716 0.2155 -0.5463 0.2075
otherfi 0.0324 0.0071 0.0316 0.0070
otherfi2/1000 -0.1291 0.0430 -0.1163 0.0419
wealth -3.0058 0.3531 -3.5698 0.3325
wealth2 0.3955 0.0743 0.4293 0.0674
house 0.2422* 0.1577 0.4412 0.1618
nrecip -0.1919 0.0945 -0.2822 0.1007
otherpi 0.1034 0.0214 0.0497 0.0169





headfam -0.8562 0.2498 -0.3404 0.2483
runrate -6.0766 1.1326 -5.5242 1.1189
constant 23.0202 3.1000 34.5199 5.9513
3In this table and in the following Table A.8 the variables age2, otherfi2 and 




























































































T able A .8: con stra in ed  covariance probit e s tim a tes  - w om en
Loglikelihood=-1931.02, 2653 obs.
______________Stars denote unsignificance at 5% level.______________
V ariable St. val. C oeff. S .E . S t. val C oeff. S .E .
Private Public
age 0.0881 0.0868 0.0255 0.1101 0.1302 0.0257
age2/1000 -1.2692 -1.2255 0.3147 -1.3117 -1.4682 0.3184
educ2 0.0844 0.03897* 0.0975 0.4405 0.4576 0.1212
educ3 0.5726 0.3691 0.1178 1.4134 1.3714 0.1710
educ4 0.2755 0.1432* 0.2212 0.8975 0.7911 0.2958
married -0.4372 -0.3647 0.0899 -0.4145 -0.3157 0.0918
North-W est 0.6398 0.7886 0.1257 -0.3147 -0.4371 0.1242
North-East 0.3653 0.5209 0.1266 -0.4322 -0.5002 0.1234
Centre 0.3740 0.4923 0.1134 -0.3043 -0.3609 0.1106
otherfi 0.0180 0.0137 0.0037 0.0176 0.0132 0.0037
otherfi2/1000 -0.0719 -0.0570 0.0216 -0.0647 -0.0446* 0.0230
wealth -1.6742 -1.2572 0.2018 -1.9883 -1.7298 0.1864
wealth2 0.2203 0.1672 0.0330 0.2391 0.1987 0.0375
house 0.1349 0.0909* 0.0824 0.2457 0.2536 0.0850
nrecip -0.1069 -0.0810* 0.0520 -0.1572 -0.1483 0.0552
otherpi 0.0576 0.0591 0.0121 0.0277 0.0155* 0.0096
otherpi2/1000 -0.6226 -0.7868 0.2362 -0.1516 -0.0714* 0.1013
pwagepr -10.2543 -12.4721 1.6871
pwagepr2 1.8539 2.1999 0.3750
pwagepu -17.3888 -20.3259 2.8241
pwagepu2 3.6219 4.3023 0.5841
headfam -0.4769 -0.4953 0.1284 -0.1896 -0.0716* 0.1332
runrate -3.3846 -3.1041 0.6125 -3.0769 -2.5081 0.6062
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